Category: Blog
The New Model IFC Still Isn’t a Good Deal for IDA Countries
In September 2019, I wrote a blog asking “Is the New Model IFC a Good Deal for IDA Countries?” It noted that the International Finance Corporation, the private sector investment arm of the World Bank Group, had stopped handing over some of its profits to IDA, the part of the World Bank Group that makes low-interest loans and grants to governments of the world’s poorest countries. Instead, IDA had started providing cash to help finance IFC deals in IDA-eligible countries—through the Private Sector Window (PSW). The net effect:
[In 2011,] IFC invested $1.5 billion in private sector projects in (2019) IDA countries as well as providing $600 million in grants to IDA. In 2018 it invested $2.4 billion in IDA countries while diverting $660 million from potential IDA lending… net investment supported by IFC in IDA countries has fallen from $2.1 billion to $1.7 billion comparing 2011 with 2018.
That was early days for the IDA PSW, and it is time for an update. Not least, rather than estimating PSW commitments, we can use real numbers, and a revised set of IDA countries. And in 2021, IFC made a payment to IDA again. Sadly, and despite that payment, the net effect of the IFC on new investment by the World Bank Group in IDA countries continues to decline.
The blue line in the chart below shows IFC board-approved investments in countries eligible to borrow from IDA in 2022. Note it excludes some regional projects that may include IDA countries as well as projects for which there have been no disbursements to date. Under both categories, for example, is the 2021 global Build-Back-Better Emerging Markets Social, Sustainability, and Sustainability-linked Transaction Bond Fund, to which the PSW committed $60 million, but which is still pending. The gold line is the sum of IFC transfers to IDA minus IDA PSW project commitments toward IFC projects. The gray line is the sum of the gold and blue lines: a measure of IFC’s impact on World Bank Group financing of new investments in IDA countries.
That sum averaged $2 billion a year 2011-2017 before falling to $1.2 billion 2018-2022. Take out 2018, and that later average drops to $0.6 billion. In fiscal year 2022, the currently recorded net impact of IFC financing on World Bank Group investment in IDA countries is actually negative, although hopefully that will improve as some recently approved IFC projects disburse their first payments. Also, the IDA PSW numbers are commitments, increasingly made to financing facilities rather than specific new IFC projects, much of which do not disburse (indeed, while the PSW reports $3 billion in aggregate commitments since it was created, aggregate disbursements are just $879 million and payouts to actual firms in developing countries even smaller again). But these are resources that could otherwise have been disbursed through standard IDA operations.
Figure 1. IFC-financed investments in IDA countries
Notes: Scale is current USD billions. Sources: PSW projects (sole MGF/MIGA projects excluded), IFC projects (using IDA borrower list, excludes regional projects), IFC-IDA transfers (earlier data from US Treasury), IDA borrowers.
Back in 2019, I wrote that “IDA countries are getting less private sector financing than they could based on past record from the IFC, they’re seeing a smaller IDA allocation for lack of transfers from the World Bank’s private sector arm, and they’re losing more cash as IDA money is used to support the IFC—which is backing private investments that are generating a declining development impact.” Thankfully, IFC project development impact has apparently stopped its decline since then. But, otherwise, the situation has only worsened in the last three years.
The IFC isn’t finding more private sector projects to support in IDA countries even with the backing of both PSW financing and retained earnings used to hire more staff to look for projects. Absent actual projects to invest in, PSW resources are increasingly committed to regional and global facilities that don’t disburse. That doesn’t help anyone, least of all IDA client countries. It is (still) past time to reconsider the new model for IFC and IDA.
The World Bank Window for Host Communities and Refugees: Opportunities for Learning and Expansion in Africa and Beyond
This blog is one in a series by experts across the Center for Global Development ahead of the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit. These posts aim to re-examine US-Africa policy and put forward recommendations to deliver on a more resilient, deeper, and mutually beneficial partnership between the United States and the nations of Africa.
The US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, DC presents an important opportunity to discuss the public good provided by African countries in hosting 7 million refugees. The US is the largest bilateral and multilateral donor to refugee responses around the world. However, with a record number of people displaced, more must be done to advance development-led approaches that recognize the reality of protracted displacement, harness the productive potential of refugees to support themselves and local economies, and respond to the shared challenges of hosts and refugees.
One critical tool that African and US officials should focus on and jointly advocate for is the World Bank’s Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR). Designed as an innovative financing mechanism, the WHR provides funding incentives for low-income countries to include refugees in poverty reduction efforts and other development programs and has a review framework to monitor and promote improvements in refugee policy. To date, 77 percent of the WHR has been committed to African countries, which host 72 percent of refugees who live in low-income, eligible countries.
As the largest shareholder of the World Bank (and with its recent replenishment pledge, the largest contributor to the bank’s concessional window), the US has a strong interest in ensuring the WHR provides the support host countries need to deliver positive development outcomes for host communities and refugee populations alike. And, in an era of squeezed aid budgets, multilateral development banks (MDBs) like the World Bank offer donors leverage: for every US$1 from the United States, the World Bank can provide an additional $4 to low-income countries.
Building on its strong partnerships with country governments, focus on poverty reduction, and multi-year funding, the World Bank can more effectively support medium-term approaches such as including refugees in health and education systems (versus parallel systems) and job creation programs. For a number of African leaders, the $2.4 billion WHR is a major source of funding that is linked to their country’s development plans, in contrast to the vast majority of humanitarian aid that directly targets refugee subsistence.
Background on the World Bank’s Window for Host Communities and Refugees
The International Development Association (IDA) is the World Bank’s main tool for supporting low-income countries with concessional financing, offering low- to no-interest rate loans and grants across a variety of sectors. In 2016, the World Bank launched the $2 billion Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities (RSW) as part of the IDA’s 18th Replenishment. The RSW lasted for three years, until June 2020, when it was redesigned as the $2.2 billion Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) as part of IDA19. (IDA19 covered two, rather than three, years due to the COVID-19 pandemic and therefore only allocated $1.3 billion of the total.) The WHR continues under IDA20 with $2.4 billion in funding.
The WHR and its predecessor the RSW were created in recognition of the fact that low-income countries that host refugees often struggle to meet their development goals for their own citizens. Humanitarian and development assistance must reach both host communities and refugee populations to move beyond care and maintenance aid approaches and improve social cohesion. The WHR provides additional financing beyond the country’s typical IDA allocation, and for most countries, does so on even more favorable terms. WHR funding supports refugee-hosting countries to mitigate shocks and create social and economic development opportunities for refugees and hosts; facilitate the social and economic inclusion of refugees in host countries and/or as returnees; and strengthen country preparedness for additional refugee flows.
The country eligibility criteria include hosting at least 25,000 refugees (or refugees make up at least 0.1 percent of the population), having a minimally adequate framework for refugee protection, and an action plan for longer-term development solutions that benefit refugees and host communities. Once a country becomes eligible, individual projects are reviewed and cleared for WHR funding by World Bank management before submission to the board for approval. Projects are expected to include efforts to improve the policy and institutional environment for refugees.
In the most recent IDA replenishment—IDA20—the World Bank committed to achieving significant policy improvement and implementation in at least 60 percent of beneficiary countries eligible for the WHR and also added new language on the importance of policy dialogue. For example, among priority activities, it highlights “support legal solutions and/or policy reforms with regard to refugees, e.g., freedom of movement, formal labor force participation, identification documents, and residency permits.”
In order to track progress, the World Bank developed the Refugee Policy Review Framework (RPRF). The framework outlines four dimensions—host communities, regulatory environment and governance, economic opportunities, and access to services—and a methodology. The first review was released in 2021 and provided detailed narratives on all dimensions for the 14 eligible countries at the time of writing. The review finds a “significant impetus for reforms,” especially at the early stages of IDA18, but noted that progress slowed amid the COVID-19 pandemic and varies significantly across contexts. For IDA20, the RPRF will be used to determine if the WHR meets its 60 percent target for significant policy improvement.
WHR funding for Africa
To date, 15 of the 17 countries that have benefitted from the WHR are in Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda. In addition, Bangladesh and Pakistan have received support.

Funding is notionally allocated to countries based on the number of refugees hosted, and the amounts that are eventually committed also depend on country demand, specific project due diligence approval, and other factors. Uganda, which hosts the most refugees in Africa, has received the most, including the maximum of $500 million in IDA19.
WHR funds have been used on a variety of projects on the continent. RSW funding in Chad incentivized and supported the country’s first-ever national refugee policy that reflects the rights of refugees as laid out in the 1951 Refugee Convention. The World Bank recently approved budget support to Liberia, including resources from the WHR, based on policy reforms which include an increase in refugees’ access to public services. South Sudan has used WHR funds to improve the socioeconomic conditions of refugees and host communities by providing critical services like basic health care, COVID-19 vaccines, clean water, and education for youth.
Recommendations to increase the WHR’s impact
US and African leaders should discuss successes of the WHR to date and commit to support ideas to increase its impact. Areas for discussion should include:
- Expanding the size of the WHR and assessing the levels of concessionality. An additional four countries joined the pool of eligible countries between IDA19 and IDA20, but funding for the window increased only modestly. The World Bank and its partners should assess opportunities to increase the size of the WHR both during the mid-term IDA assessment (when funds can be reallocated based on obligations and need) and in the next round of fundraising for IDA. As part of discussions on reforming and expanding MDBs to provide global public goods, IDA contributors including the US should consider the levels of concessionality offered through the WHR. It will be important to balance levels that incentivize country demand, appropriate recognition of the public good component (with many benefits accruing to others in the region and the world), and the need to preserve the leverage of donor dollars.
- Aligning US and other bilateral funding with WHR investments: At the summit, the US could commit to co-financing WHR projects through USAID and/or State. Aligning and crowding in bilateral funding would increase the program reach and policy impact of WHR projects. As the leading donor in refugee response, the US should also work with other bilateral donors to encourage co-financing.
- Executing on the increased focus on policy reforms, especially those that facilitate refugee economic contributions. The core promise of the WHR is that it provides an infusion of resources toward realizing the development potential of hosts and refugees. For example, the upfront costs of including refugees in education and health systems is both more efficient than creating parallel systems and yields longer-term and sustainable benefits as refugees contribute to local economies. However, these benefits only accrue if refugees are offered meaningful de jure and de facto opportunities to make these contributions. Recognizing the political sensitivity of refugee work in many contexts, the WHR has made significant progress, but more attention is required. For African countries, it is critical to make de facto reforms and track implementation progress at the local level, because funders need to see results that development carrots can actually work. US policymakers must make their support for these reforms clear at the summit and beyond, through continued diplomatic engagement on the rights of refugees across bilateral and multilateral fora.
- Considering independent de jure and de facto policy assessments in addition to the RPRF, and linking policy assessment to financing allocations. The WHR should increase transparency and coordination around discussions of each country’s Refugee Policy Review Framework, and how the RPRF is connected to negotiations around specific programs funded by the WHR. In addition the World Bank should consider linking policy and implementation to concessional finance allocations, so that countries with the most inclusive practices receive more per refugee hosted..
- Promoting WHR-like tools and approaches at other MDBs and donors. The World Bank has led on the agenda of recognizing refugee hosting as a global public good, supporting development outcomes to complement humanitarian relief, and creating financial instruments to respond. The World Bank also hosts a trust fund, the Global Concessional Financing Facility, that includes other MDBs and supports middle-income countries hosting refugees. However, the contributions are ad hoc and insufficient to meet current needs. The Inter-American Development Bank has a dedicated migration program with strong leadership, but also requires additional and predictable funding. Other MDBs—including big players in Africa like the African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank—should learn lessons from the WHR and develop robust, development-focused instruments to provide greater support to refugee-hosting countries in their regions. The United States is a leading shareholder in almost all MDBs, and concerted US leadership to elevate such instruments could yield dividends for both displaced persons and the communities that host them. For these tools to meet their potential, they require predictable funding at levels that can meaningfully shape a country’s approach.
- Elevating in-country coordination and consultations, including refugee and host community leaders, on the RPRF and WHR programs. Currently, the World Bank and UNHCR are systematically engaged in WHR discussions with country governments, but inclusion of other key stakeholders occurs on an ad hoc basis. The US should ensure engagement of relevant embassy staff in country dialogues to support joint prioritization and co-financing, and as mentioned above, encourage the participation of other bilateral donors. African leaders can support greater coordination across affected ministries, recognizing that support for host communities and refugees crosses sectors. Finally, all parties should work to deepen the engagement of refugees and host community members in policy and program discussions. For example, country-level coordination platforms could host regular consultations with refugee and host organizations, ensuring that convenings are substantive and tailored to facilitate participation.
Conclusion
In October, Secretary Yellen called for reforming and expanding the MDBs to address global public goods in addition to country development priorities. For African leaders of refugee-hosting countries and US officials, the WHR, as a unique tool to provide significant development financing for a global challenge, should be a high priority for discussion.
The authors thank Cassie Zimmer, Jocilyn Estes, Erin Collinson, Clemence Landers, and Sarah Miller for their input.
Stay tuned for more analysis on the summit in the coming days, and sign up for our US development policy newsletter to get updates in your inbox.
MDBs for a Global Future: Centering Borrowing Country Perspectives
We live in a world confronted by multiple global crises. Many of these crises—like climate change and global pandemics—defy national borders and will require unprecedented levels of investment to be contained. Global public goods (GPGs) like emissions mitigation or the development of new antibiotics are key to a less crisis prone world, but they have been underinvested in. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) like the World Bank are well positioned to address many of these global challenges by virtue of their size, reach, and scope. The challenge ahead is how to transform—and transform quickly—these organization so they are more relevant for today’s world.
As part of a major new CGD initiative, MDBs for a Global Future, we are exploring how the MDBs can be transformed for the challenges of the coming decades, what those changes to the MDB system look like in practice, and what adequate financing and technical assistance is required.
An effective transformation of the MDB system can’t happen from Washington alone—what emerging markets and low-income countries alike want from the MDB system will need to be front and center. To ensure borrower perspectives are a major part of the conversation, we held an event with finance officials from Egypt, Uruguay, Senegal and Nigeria on MDB reform alongside the Annual Meetings. Now, we’re following it up with more in-depth discussion from two more finance ministers.
Nadia Al Fettah, the Minister of Economy and Finance of Morocco, and Michel Patrick Boisvert, the Minister of Economy and Finance of the Republic of Haiti, kindly agreed to write essays on what they see as the most important role for the MDBs in addressing current and long-term global challenges, and how they’d like to see the system evolve. Both ministers emphasize the need for MDBs to take on a larger role in providing GPGs and to increase both their financial and technical support. To do so, they both call for MDBs to adopt new instruments and policies and argue that financing must both increase in volume and be used more efficiently. Success also depends on reaching consensus among shareholders and alignment between international institutions, developing countries and other development partners.
Minister Al Fettah calls for MDBs to be at the forefront of the international community in supporting the protection of GPGs, especially climate, biodiversity, and global health, and to be more proactive in anticipating and helping developing countries prepare for future crises. She calls for and lays out a plan for “a comprehensive and profound reform of the current multilateral system, combining efficiency and inclusiveness and conditioning the transition of the global system towards a more integrated, prosperous, fair and sustainable one, capable of better managing possible future crises.”
Minister Boisvert focuses on actions the MDBs and other international actors like the International Monetary Fund can take to address food insecurity, climate change, fragility, unemployment, and migration, which impede progress in growth and development. The Minister emphasizes the need for policies to account for country and regional contexts and promote—rather than stifle—national productivity and income growth.
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The Development Finance Agenda Must Adapt to Africa’s Reality
The global financial architecture is no longer aligned with the economic, social, and environmental needs of many African economies. But addressing this misalignment will require a strong African voice from leaders and policy institutes working together to determine what changes are needed.
To help address these issues and develop a more unified African perspective, a group of ten African think tanks and policy institutes gathered on November 15, 2022, to launch the amplifying Africa’s voice initiative.
Two tracks of connected reflections
African countries are being faced with twin challenges. On the one hand, financing has slowed down at a time when it is needed the most to recover from a succession of negative shocks – from COVID-19 to the current rise in food prices and interest rates. In parallel, ongoing global changes are reopening fundamental questions on the type of economic models that can effectively deliver growth convergence in the future. Africa’s leaders need to lead a “global wake-up call” for action in order to avert such serious interlocking challenges.
The recent series of negative shocks have put many African countries at risk of falling into a prolonged period of debt overhang with low growth. To make a bad situation worse, the recent rise in global interest rates and food and energy prices has reduced further access to foreign exchange, at a time when more than half of the countries that had borrowed on the Eurobond market have lost market access. Much needs to be done to prevent the current situation from deteriorating further, especially as countries are confronted with refinancing walls in the next few years. But so far, there are no credible plans that can avert a grave crisis:
- The instrument to address debt distress, the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) has ended,
- the $100b pledge in green finance has not been delivered,
- the prospect of $100b of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) re-allocation remains unfulfilled,
- International financial institutes continue to lend at a business-as-usual rate and,
- Zambia, Ethiopia, and Chad have already been in a state of default for two years, without the G20-initiated Common Framework managing to find a resolution.
The challenges ahead are not limited to short-term recovery, but also to longer term growth. There was an early indication by 2015 that growth opportunities were faltering – which are now more evident: the export-led model has become less promising with the growth of automation of manufacturing; global growth is falling because of geo-political divergences and stagflation; and the economic drag exerted by climate warming is increasing.
Moreover, short- and medium-term issues interact as they are inextricably related, meaning that progress on all fronts is needed, even if execution is sequenced. Recovery cannot be built on austerity alone but needs to involve moving towards new growth opportunities. But new money to support a new growth path is unlikely to flow in the absence of adequate debt restructuring. The injection of new money to fund a new growth path also remains contingent on a better working of the Common Framework and closer collaboration with China, clearer agreements on climate finance, and multilateral development bank (MDB) reform.
To help address these issues and develop a more unified African perspective, a group of ten African think tanks and policy institutes gathered on November 15, 2022, to launch the Amplifying Africa’s Voice Initiative.
This is a project which goal is to inject more forcefully African voices, ideas, and interests in the ongoing global debates on the urgent reforms needed in the international system to advance the cause of sustainable development. To amplify Africa’s voice, the policy institutes will join forces to raise awareness, build technical knowledge, and undertake joint analysis and research reflecting African perspectives and positions. The analysis and research will be used in advocacy efforts and to inform African leaders so they can engage in international negotiations more effectively.
A Meeting of Minds
In their first meeting, participants described the ongoing global and regional conversations in which they participate. They agreed that they could have a more formidable impact in all these instances as a collective. The ongoing global conversations include a large range of issues, from how to finance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the climate goals; to the evolution of financial relations with the capital market, China, and MDBs. It also addresses the needed reforms in the international financial architecture, including the re-allocation of SDRs, MDBs capital increase, and how to make the Common Framework for debt-restructuring work. While a few new initiatives are starting to address some of the failures of the global financial architecture, most notably the G20 Independent Review of MDBs’ Capital Adequacy Frameworks, much more will be needed to renew the development framework, as suggested by the recent Bridgetown Agenda initiative championed by Barbados Prime Minister Mottley.
The Way Forward
While the issues that affect Africa are global, the drivers behind them have an outsized impact on African economies.
To participate in international discussions on reforming the global financial architecture, the group of African policy institutes emphasized that an important task is to figure out “what Africa needs and what it wants”. Introspective efforts are needed to figure out why African countries have fallen again into a debt crisis, and what safeguards can work in the future to avoid yet another repeat.
Equally, a recovery process must be inscribed in longer term plans, and supported by country-defined commitments.. They have a role to play in supporting MDB reforms, whereby those institutions are able to fund adaptation at scale and to simplify their business model. The methods to enhancements of private flows must also be reviewed to make them work at scale and the Common Framework requires a deeper participation of China, which an African think tank collective could elicit by organizing a structured discussion on reformed win-win rules of debt restructuring adapted to current circumstances.
Besides good ideas, communication will be key. Beyond a small group of Ministers of Finance and a few Heads of State, Africa’s voice is inaudible amongst ongoing global conversations. To convince world powers to implement changes that are in Africa’s interests, good ideas won’t be sufficient – the volume needs to be turned up. In this regard, the group stressed the need for Africa, including heads of states and core institutions such as the African Union and the African Development Bank, to have more voice in international discussions, to be able to influence fora such at the United Nations, the G7, G20, MDB boards, and important bilateral instances. Both efforts must proceed in parallel. In the coming months, the policy institutes engaged in the process will start addressing key technical issues to figure out what Africa needs in terms of international and regional reforms, and how to make this happen.