A Bank for the World?

Earlier this week, the Financial Times reported that the United States Treasury Department—the largest shareholder in the World Bank—delivered a letter protesting the Bank’s continued failure to meet the urgency of the biggest shared global challenges we currently face. The letter described “specific gaps and room for increasing climate ambition” and called for more “forceful and constructive leadership” from the Bank.

This isn’t a fringe position: at a time when governments seem able to agree on very little, the consensus around the Bank’s need to scale up its engagement on climate and other global public goods (GPGs) is striking. But “scaling up ambition” is vague, and there remains a great deal of work to do to pin down what it means in practice for the World Bank to rise to the GPG challenge, institutionally. It’s unclear what doing more on global challenges would imply for the Bank’s overall mission, products, country engagement, and financing model: these details need to be fleshed out. Whether the World Bank can evolve into a climate and GPG Bank will ultimately hinge not just on shareholders’ ability to arrive at a common vision but also their ability to agree on the details of a coherent plan and ambitious financing package to get there. In a new note, published today, we set out how it can get there.

As one of the only truly global institutions, the World Bank is uniquely positioned to be the world’s premier source of funding for GPGs. But despite its global coverage, the World Bank has never truly been oriented towards global challenges. Its mission has been defined primarily by individual developing country problems and priorities. This makes sense when the mission is only growth and poverty reduction domestically, but less when assessed against the progress required to avert catastrophic climate or health events.   

For that to change, the Bank’s financing for GPGs must become much larger and more effective, or it will fail to make a meaningful and measurable difference. The World Bank is already a major source of external finance for GPGs: between 2016-2021, it delivered $109 billion in climate finance, with annual commitments now exceeding $20 billion. But the scale of the financing requirements to address global public bads vastly exceeds the World Bank’s current financing capacity. And despite the headline figures, much of the GPG agenda has been deployed via trust funds and sometimes coordination with financial intermediary funds (FIFs), but these are small in size and ad hoc in relation to the Bank’s core agenda. (There is a small GPG fund financed by IDA reflows but amounts and functions to date have been too small to yet be significant.)

Disbursements from World Bank Recipient-Executed Trust Funds compared to IBRD and IDA, FY15-FY19 (in US billions)*

*Note: Chart includes overall data for recipient-executed trust funds, illustrating the relatively common use of trust funds across World Bank activities. 

Source: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/461611570786898020/pdf/Trust-Fund-Annual-Report-for-2018-2019.pdf

Addressing these weaknesses in the GPG response complements the existing country-based lending model but requires adjustments in approach and new tools that are more attractive to recipient countries. Country demand is at the heart of the World Bank’s existing model, and borrowing for GPG programs domestically often fits uneasily with restricted fiscal space and domestically determined policy priorities. And the calculus of a government’s demand for borrowing in this area is different depending on the salience of differing GPGs to different kinds of countries. A Bank that addresses GPGs effectively needs an offer that countries find attractive.

Alongside this, the Bank needs to directly confront trade-offs between development and GPG actions and take a clear stand on where it makes sense to use the marginal dollar raised to address one or the other. It may well be that in some countries, it is more efficient to use newly raised resources on development, until some absorption or returns bottleneck is reached, at which point spending shifts towards GPG priorities. Any credible GPG agenda will also need to be underwritten by a large grants funding stream, including for middle-income countries. Governments have little incentive to borrow to invest in programs where the benefits may not be directly captured the country, but they still must repay the loan. All of this points to an expansion, rather than just a reconfiguration of the Bank’s operations.

Such an expansion will mean more money but also new policies, pricing, and incentives, and models of financing for GPGs. There is—as the Treasury’s letter suggests—an urgent need for leadership, analysis, and directed financing of different kinds in policy and operations that can drive long-term, measurable progress towards global goals. To operationalize these approaches, the Bank will not only need to find a practical way to define what is (and what is not) a GPG and measure externalities associated with investments, but also to understand the possibilities for differential subsidization of the externalities across projects of different kinds as well as countries at different income levels. GPG solutions may require creative thinking and financing non-sovereigns in-country or at regional/global levels. Without new ideas, the Bank may run into the same kinds of difficulty it encountered in providing an early guarantee or lending to COVAX, the vaccine pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A).

There is a clear hunger for the World Bank to be a leader on GPG issues, not only as a financier or vehicle. The Bank brings analytical capabilities, capacity building, and intellectual leadership to both country development and global challenges. The global system lacks an effective focal point in the fight against global public bads. Deploying the World Bank effectively, both as a financial and an intellectual leader, can fill that gap.

Keep an eye out for our upcoming work on MDBs for a global future.


The Future of Work in Africa: Eight Opportunities for Development Finance Institutions

Africa’s current job market is not providing enough jobs, and the available jobs are not of sufficient quality for Africans to live a life of dignity, free of poverty. Africa’s future work will still be impacted by present challenges, but there are also several new opportunities across different sectors – fueled by the transition to digital and green economies, increased continental trade, and the potential of Africa’s women, youth, and its informal sector.

The report Shifting and Accelerating DFI Investments for More Decent Jobs in Africacommissioned by ACET and ONE, identifies eight opportunities for DFIs to support future quality and green jobs on the continent:

1. A MODERNIZED AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IS CRITICAL TO CREATING THE NUMBER OF JOBS NEEDED, BUT QUALITY MUST BE IMPROVED

Direct investment in agriculture accounts for just 6% of the five bilateral DFIs’ portfolios, despite all stating this as a priority sector[1]. Agriculture accounts for the largest share of employment in Africa, particularly in rural areas, with numbers employed expected to rise despite the sector’s relative decline[2]. To combat the challenges of poor quality employment, relating to low productivity, climate change adaptation, informality, and gender inequality, the future of agriculture in Africa must be different. The focus should be on utilizing pioneering new technologies and business models, improving the productivity of farms[3], raising labor standards, and adapting to climate change. Giving women equal access to farm inputs could raise crop production by up to 19%[4]. Studies show that the top three reasons for inadequate private sector engagement in African agriculture are access to affordable finance, development of the value chain, and infrastructure access — all of which DFIs play a role in solving[5].

2. MANUFACTURING CAN CREATE STEADY JOBS, BUT THE SECTOR REQUIRES SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT

Africa has the agricultural and mineral inputs required to boost manufacturing, and future improvements in transport, power, and export infrastructure. Relative wages are also becoming lower than the rest of the world, providing an opportunity for expansion of the sector. African countries have already seen success in the use of Special Economic Zones, which could provide an avenue for future growth of manufacturing and exports on the continent. Realizing these opportunities requires greater and more targeted investment. Africa’s manufacturing output has the potential to double to almost $1 trillion per year by 2025, with roughly half that production remaining on the continent and the rest exported to other world regions[6]. Modern industry provides relatively well-paid jobs for large numbers of unskilled or undereducated workers — particularly those who are not integrated in the formal economy. Despite the manufacturing sector maintaining a relatively stable share of output, information and communications technology (ICT) based services, tourism, and transport are outpacing the growth of manufacturing in many African countries[7]. Insufficient human capital, higher costs, and access to markets have been just a few of the areas that have held African manufacturing back[8]. If the AfCFTA is successful, the manufacturing sector is estimated to create an additional 14 million stable, well-paid jobs[9].

3. AFRICA’S DIGITAL SECTOR CAN PROVIDE QUALITY JOBS IF HIGH-RISK INVESTMENTS ARE MADE NOW

Africa’s digital economy is growing, and is expected to reach $180 billion by 2025 (5.2% of GDP) and $712 billion by 2050 (8.5% of GDP)[10]. Digitalization has huge potential to create new jobs and boost the productivity of existing ones. A subsection of the digital economy will employ iWorkers, who rely on e-commerce platforms for work such as delivery and taxi services. These workers could make up 10% of Africa’s workforce by 2030[11]. Just a 10% increase in email use raises the number of full-time workers in a firm by 12-14%[12]. Creating digital jobs disproportionately helps youth and women, but is generally concentrated in large cities, meaning that greater effort is needed to safeguard rural inequality[13]. Digitalization also improves the productivity of MSMEs, again raising wages. Some point to the risks around the displacement of jobs, but the evidence is mixed, with fast internet connectivity having large positive impacts on sub-Saharan African job creation, without displacing low-skilled jobs[14]. Tackling barriers to creating jobs through digital transformation will be critical. These relate to skills matching, physical infrastructure, legal and regulatory environments, as well as concentrating on rural digitalization[15]. Only one out of five African countries have a legal framework for digital security, and 11 countries have adopted substantive laws on cybercrime[16]. The digital infrastructure is also insufficient, and inputs such as reliable power are needed. 80% of the $7 billion received for digital infrastructure in 2018 was from the private sector[17]. This is an area in which DFIs can and should invest.

4. MSMES AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR WILL DRIVE JOB CREATION, SO QUALITY MUST BE SAFEGUARDED AND MONITORED

The informal sector is the main gateway to job markets for the vast majority of Africa’s working-age population, employing 75% of graduates aged 15-29[18]. It is estimated to create 90% of new jobs in Africa[19]. Many of these jobs will be through MSMEs, which hold the key to unlocking mass employment opportunities. Yet concerns remain around the quality of informal sector jobs, and their impact on existing inequalities. The sector earns less money, with some estimating they are just 20-25% as productive as the formal sector. The workforce is 66% female and, along with agriculture, often employs people living in extreme poverty[20]. Financing must happen alongside an improvement in the productivity of the sector, including upgrading the skills of workers, especially youth and women, and facilitating a move to formalization in the future[21]. DFIs investing in MSMEs must therefore monitor and report progress and safeguards. To unlock more jobs, the primary challenge faced by MSMEs is a lack of access to affordable finance. MSMEs in SSA have an unmet financing need of $331 billion per annum[22]. In Africa, for the 20-30% that can access bank lending, interest rates start at around 20% and can reach 50% if taken from an informal money lender[23]. DFI lending to financial institutions helps provide access to this finance through financial institutions, enabling them to provide it at a cheaper rate.

5. TARGETED DFI INVESTMENT IS KEY TO UNLOCKING PRODUCTIVITY GAINS ASSOCIATED WITH GENDER PARITY

Accelerating progress toward gender parity could boost African economies by the equivalent of 10% of their collective GDP by 2025[24]. This also has spillover effects on education, health, and economic opportunities for children, through the allocation of household resources. Opportunities for women’s gainful employment overlap greatly with other areas and include agriculture, the AfCFTA, and digital and green jobs. Agricultural productivity gaps between female and male farmers in six African countries ranged from 23% in Tanzania to 66% in Niger after accounting for differences in plot size and geography. However, the coronavirus pandemic also demonstrated the vulnerability of women in the workforce, making social protection and other measures vital to unlocking their productivity potential[25]. There have been improvements in the use of a gender lens in DFIs’ operations, yet it is unclear whether investments in process changes are leading to beneficial gender-related outcomes. For instance, a Centre for Global Development (CGD) survey found that half of the DFIs assessed do not systematically incorporate gender scores into each investment approval decision by the investment committee[26]. DFIs’ investments must be targeted toward expanding investment impacts towards women, and processes should be implemented to ensure systematic incorporation of gender scores into investment processes, to reduce existing significant gender gaps in the economy and across society.

6. ADDRESSING THE SKILLS MISMATCH IS CRITICAL TO YOUTH ACCESSING DECENT JOBS

Youth unemployment is one of the biggest unrealized opportunities facing Africa today. In 2016, youth unemployment in North Africa was more than three times higher than adult unemployment[27].  Africa’s youth are well-positioned to capitalize on the digital and green transformations that are already underway. AfDB sees Africa’s youth opportunities in agriculture, industry, and ICT, and the support of the private sector finance in achieving this. Preparing Africa’s youth to create and take job opportunities involves addressing supply-side factors such as overcoming educational and skills mismatch and inadequate training. 45% of youths feel their skills don’t match local labor markets, 28% of youth feel underqualified, and 17% even feel overqualified[28]. On the demand side, firms employing 20 or more are most likely to cite inadequate skills as a constraint to business growth, as well as export-oriented firms, which has implications for new trade opportunities[29]. Only 1 of the 10 DFIs in the sample tracks jobs for youth in their investments. As the largest and most critical challenge facing Africa’s labor markets, DFIs must not only include, but prioritize this in their impact assessment, to ensure their investments help tackle it.

7. GREEN TRANSITION OPPORTUNITIES MUST BE HARNESSED

The Paris Agreement states that the world should be at net zero emissions by 2050. Each country has developed its nationally determined contributions (NDCs) roadmap to reach this goal[30]. The transition to a low-carbon economy would lead to net job creation worldwide, and Africa has a great opportunity to capture many of these. Green jobs will be characterized by nonroutine thinking and higher dependence on formal education, work experience, and on-the-job training. Many future green jobs are in agriculture, where climate technologies will need to be leveraged to boost agricultural productivity, or in manufacturing where greener products will be produced. Job creation will also be in the circular economy, such as recycling plastic and converting food waste into fertilizers and other products[31]. Other industries that are linked to supporting the green transition, such as mining cobalt, lithium, copper, manganese, nickel, and zinc, will provide better-paying jobs as their prices increase with demand[32]. Just half of the 10 DFIs assessed track how much of their portfolio is allocated to green or climate finance generally, although their definitions vary. None track green jobs. The IRIS+ indicators provided by GIIN use the ILO guidance to create a green jobs indicator, which DFIs can use as a starting point to begin tracking and better understanding this critical component of Africa’s future jobs[33].

8. EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFCFTA WILL FACILITATE ACCESS TO A WIDER MARKET FOR MSMES AND DRIVE DEMAND FOR LABOUR

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA) is the largest free trade area in the world. It has the potential to bring 30 million people out of poverty and raise the incomes of 68 million others living on less than $5.50 per day[34]. The AfCFTA will have a range of benefits that can improve the quantity and quality of work as businesses access a larger market for selling their products and benefit from increased competition. Whilst there will be winners and losers, the manufacturing sector, in particular, will see strong job growth, with energy-intensive steel and aluminum manufacturing jobs alone increasing by 2.4 million[35]. Increased business competition enhances productivity and increases wages. Compared with a business-as-usual scenario, implementing AfCFTA would lead to an almost 10% increase in wages by 2035, with larger gains for unskilled workers and women. Sectors that typically employ more women, such as recreation, are set to create more jobs, and therefore disproportionately benefit women[36]. Implementing AfCFTA requires innovative mobilization of long-term capital for increasing intra-African and global trade. This would require the creation of a viable, sustainable, effective, and standardized continental infrastructure and systems, coupled with governments’ support in the removal of policy barriers to achieving the objectives of AfCFTA. DFIs are well placed to mobilize the private capital needed to do this.

Read the full report: Shifting and Accelerating DFI Investments for More Decent Jobs in Africa

Energy in a World in Transition: Challenges, Opportunities and Perspectives

The Energy Transition process is complex and multifaceted, with substantial impacts on the energy industries’ business models. In order to contribute with a greater understanding of this trend, CEBRI, in partnership with BMA, organized a collection of articles that analyzes the main implications of this process, which is well positioned to be one of the major drivers of economic transformation in this historic period. 

Published in English and Portuguese, the collection is structured around the theme “Energy in a World in Transition”, and assesses a global process from a Brazilian perspective. The first edition, published in June, included important reflections on the future of Brazilian energy.

An Open Letter to G7 Finance Ministers

Your urgent leadership towards a data-driven modern-day Marshall Plan for People and Planet

In these historically tough times, when all tools of global policy must be maximised, we are writing to remind you and the other G7 Finance Ministers of your responsibility as the biggest group of shareholders of the IMF and World Bank. So we ask you please to honestly ask yourselves this question: are you doing everything possible, in close cooperation with the G20 and others, to direct these institutions, and the wider family of multilateral development banks, to respond adequately to our concurrent crises of covid, unequal recoveries, climate and conflict? Are they delivering on their core mission of ending extreme poverty, delivering on our shared Sustainable Development and Climate Goals? Are they helping the supporters of global cooperation counter the further fragmentation of our world through geopolitical rivalry?

The answer seems to be: “no”. This letter contains proposals to help you make this a “yes”.

The international financial institutions are not currently designed for multiple, multi-country crises, financing Global Public Goods, and underpinning a global cooperation architecture that builds bridges between countries of different development levels and trajectories or geopolitical alignment. The IBRD, for example, is funded to respond to one mid-sized crisis each decade. They are not equipped to tackle the climate crisis, prevent and prepare for future pandemics, tackle entrenched hunger and poverty, and address fragility and debt crises – all at the same time. Secretary Yellen has clearly articulated the need for change to reach scale in her remarks at the time of the Spring meetings.

The buck for this stops with the major shareholders: you. So, starting with this week’s G7 Finance Minister meeting, you now have the historic opportunity and power to really drive change.

The case for more urgent action via these global financial entities is overwhelming. Fossil fuels are burning up our future – not just through “carbon emissions”, but also through “corruption emissions” and “conflict emissions”. This fossil fuel fragility – of our global economy, polity, society, and ecology can now be replaced with resilience. Your finance ministries and these global institutions you hold key responsibility for can now articulate an historic plan to tackle the fallouts from conflict and covid in the short term while scaling long term investments into a strategic win-win data-driven Marshall Plan for People and Planet: a green jobs boom which helps prevent climate catastrophe.

The strategy would immediately reinvigorate, not replace, the Bretton Woods Institutions. In this strategy, global public and private finance will partner with country and local level leadership, so global finance better supports both local finesse and the global common good. This strategy answers the urgent partnership plea from emerging economies for more voice in decision making and more velocity and volume in terms of investment flows.

Investment levels need to be raised by well over one trillion dollars each year for the next decades in low and middle-income economies. This level of financing should support country platforms producing a strategic pipeline of projects focusing on human capital, sustainable infrastructure, adaptation, resilience, nature conservation and agriculture, forestry and land use.

Here are the short-term priorities to help jump-start the process towards constructing an historic scaled financing plan:

–          Immediately meet your goals of reallocating 100b of your SDRs (or fiscal equivalents) as promised, then exceed this. These SDRs must support African and other emerging countries with mechanisms that stabilize the balance of payments and reduce borrowing costs for essential sustainable investments.  This will require ensuring the Resilience and Sustainability Trust is actually usable by developing economies and/or using SDRs outside the confines of the IMF.

–          Reduce and restructure debts of countries who are committed to an ambitious green transition through a radically improved Debt Common Framework, with debt standstill or emergency liquidity upon application, and tackling the structural issues – such as lack of transparency, clear timelines, and borrower capacity – to improve debt resolution mechanisms.

–          Increase the quality and quantity of aid and concessional finance. No humane or self-interested high-income country should be cutting aid at this time and every international financial institution should be stretched creatively– testing the limits of capital adequacy, affirming callable capital counts, allowing alternative capital funding and non-voting shares (so philanthropies and ESG funds can play their part), and ensuring nothing is wasted on “20th century practises.”

Beyond the short term we urge you to launch an empowered political process to re-invigorate these institutions and deliver on a strategic global financing plan. Key goals are:

–          Stronger national coordination between strengthened national level platforms for change and global sources of public and private finance. At the national level country-owned platforms must be strengthened to produce strategic pipelines of sustainable infrastructure and human capital projects. These must be connected to clear and independently verifiable SDG & climate Key Performance Indicators.

–           Stronger global coordination The G7’s new partnership to “”build back better for the world” & emerging “carbon clubs”, the G20’s “Recover Stronger” plan & Compact with Africa, the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, the EU’s Global Gateway and a “greener” evolution of China’s Global Development Initiative must all be better aligned to support this growing pipeline of strategic projects. For this to happen G7 initiatives like the “carbon clubs” need to be designed from the very beginning in an inclusive way that give countries beyond the G7 a relevant say.

–           Ambitious leveraging of public capital to mobilize all other forms of capital, including through tried-and-true mechanisms such as substantial but conditional capital increases to MDBs that are fully aligned with the SDGs and Paris Agendas. Publicly discussing, then regularly sharing, the methodologies by which Credit Rating Agencies review the credit ratings of the MDBs would also help reduce inefficiency in leveraging the MDBs capital. The G7 and other shareholders should work towards a doubling of capital for entities like the World Bank if the above steps are taken – so that these more efficient financial entities can then go even further towards making all our futures safer, more sustainable and inclusive.

–           Strengthening universality and reciprocity in global cooperation: massive scaling-up of the funds for global cooperation needs to go hand-in-hand with much more ambitious efforts to transform the G7’s economies themselves in line with the SDGs and the climate goals in ways that are also conducive to emerging and low-income economies. To this end, the universality of the International Finance Institutions and the reciprocity of global cooperation need to be enhanced, holding also G7 countries accountable on their domestic policies and furthering mutually transformative cooperation. The global common good cannot be furthered by a “20th century approach” by which only one part of the world has the problems and the other the solutions.

Taken together these steps can help lead and leverage the additional trillion dollars a year required. This will amount to a new financing framework, a grand bargain between historic emitters and low-income low emitters, who must also step up their own resource mobilisation, investment and accountable delivery efforts. Such a strategy would more equitably balance: the benefits of higher levels of investment in human, natural, and climate change related capital, with the risks of higher debt levels in the short to medium terms; the interests of creditors and debtors; the interests of emerging and advanced economies; and of current and future generations.

The longer you, individually and collectively, delay your leadership responsibility, the higher the price tag will be in terms of costs born now and by future generations –with more wars, famines, conflicts, pandemics.

Amongst you are leaders who can rise to this moment in history. We need you all to be.

We look forward to your further leadership and ongoing exchanges for urgent change.

Yours,

Amar Bhattacharya, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings InstituteEmmanuel Guerin, Executive Director for the International Group at the European Climate Foundation

Sukehiro Hasegawa, Chair, Japan Commission on Global Governance

Dr Miwa Hirono, Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University

Prof. Anna-Katharina Hornidge, Director of the Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik

Adolf Kloke-Lesch, Co-Chair Sustainable development Solutions EuropeHomi Kharas, Senior Fellow – Global Economy and DevelopmentCenter for Sustainable Development at Brookings

Stefano Manservisi, Adjunct Professor at the European University Institute School of Transnational Governance and at Sciences-Po/Paris School for International Affairs.

Mavis Owusu-Gyamfi, Executive Vice President, African Center for Economic Transformation

Ronan Palmer, Associate Director, Clean Economy, E3G

Sara Pantuliano, Chief Executive, ODI

Rathin Roy, Managing Director, ODI

Jamie Drummond, Co-Founder, Sharing Strategies & The ONE Campaign