Hybrid Capital and SDRs for the Uninitiated

More than a year after the IMF general allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and the G20 promise to recycle $100 billion of SDRs, how much has been achieved? The quick answer: $60 billion has been pledged, and there is hope that the United States will contribute another $21 billion. But how will the recycled SDRs be used? 

The IMF would like to absorb about $65 billion through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) and the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST), which leaves about $35 billion looking for a home. As we have noted elsewhere, multilateral development banks (MDBs) seem a logical place to use some SDRs. However, MDBs are still without any SDRs, despite being on the frontlines of the main challenges we face, especially climate finance and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). MDBs have been snubbed by SDR holders looking for recycling options because of the technical hurdles. 

The first challenge lies in the mechanics of the SDR system: not everyone can hold SDRs. Only certain institutions and countries are prescribed holders. Some MDBs have this status, and some do not. Also, the G20 has insisted that recycled SDRs maintain their reserve asset characteristic; they must be easily recalled if needed and not put at too much risk. But MDB investments are long term and riskier than, say, government bonds. So using SDRs at the MDBs is not a natural fit.    

Some MDBs are considering using a hybrid capital structure to overcome these problems. In this blog, we briefly explain the nature of hybrid capital and how SDRs might come into play.  

What is hybrid capital?

The most obvious question regarding hybrid capital is, what makes it hybrid? Suppose you have money to invest. You could purchase equity (that is, company shares), thus making you an owner who will share in the enterprise’s profits. Or you can buy fixed-income securities (that is, bonds), through which you lend your money to the company with the promise of reimbursement plus interest.  

Hybrid capital (or synthetic security) is a fixed-income financial instrument with both equity and debt properties. It is sold to investors as a fixed-income instrument (like a bond), and it does not dilute the capital of the MDB. But the terms offered by the instrument make it look like a permanent investment in the institution: it has a perpetual maturity (i.e., the MDB never intends to pay off or redeem the loan). However, the MDB does offer the investor the opportunity to cash in the bond after an extended period, say 10 years. The hybrid capital would rank senior to paid-in capital but junior to other unsecured debt. However, given the MDBs’ AAA-rated financial management, the risk of lost hybrid capital is minimal. Furthermore, some funds invested in the hybrid capital will be held in reserve should a lending country need to retrieve its SDRs prematurely. 

From an accounting perspective, hybrid capital will be considered equity on the MDB balance sheet. This allows the MDB to raise money to increase its loanable funds by issuing bonds, which the hybrid capital guarantees. This so-called leveraging of hybrid capital is regulated by shareholders, who decide how much the MDB can borrow from capital markets. Typically, the MDBs can borrow three to four times the equity value on capital markets and thus lend that much more. Credit rating agencies have broadly accepted this use of hybrid capital. Therefore, the MDB’s credit rating would not be at risk from leveraging the hybrid capital. 

Where do SDRs fit in?

MDBs that are looking to expand their lending need more capital. But many of their shareholders are facing fiscal constraints. They cannot spend money from their budgets to increase MDB capital. 

The 2021 allocation increased countries’ SDR holdings, and in many advanced countries these assets are sitting unused in country coffers. Investing these unused SDRs in MDB hybrid capital has four advantages:

  1. There is no direct cost to the investing country as the SDRs were a gift from the IMF.

  2. The government does not cede control of its SDRs, as it is lending them to the MDBs and can get them back if needed.

  3. The loan is very low risk compared to other investments.

  4. Each SDR invested leverages three to four times as many loanable funds. 

Hybrid capital is not a perfect substitute for increasing paid-in capital. But it does give shareholders an immediate and low-cost opportunity to support the expansion of MDB loans.  


Amplifying Africa’s Voice – Global Financial Architecture, MDB Reform and Climate Finance

On November 15, ACET and Finance for Development Labs (FDL), in collaboration with the Transformation Leadership Panel (TLP), launched the Amplifying Africa’s Voice initiative, which seeks to amplify Africa’s voice in the dialogue on reforming the global financial architecture.

About the Initiative

The Amplifying Africa’s Voice initiative will support a process of engagement, knowledge sharing, research, and advocacy with a select group of African economic policy institutes and thought leaders. This process will lead to a better understanding of, and appreciation for, the global financial architecture challenges. It will also lead to African-led analysis, research, and perspectives that will be translated into both policy briefs for African leaders and advocacy content. Likewise, such engagement will provide opportunities for global experts and African experts to share ideas, comment on research, and identify solutions.

Partnerships

The initiative will engender partnerships between economic policy institutes, joint analysis and research, and common positions on issues such as SDR rechanneling, enhanced DSSI, the Common Framework, liquidity and/or sustainability frameworks, natural disaster clauses, debt management and relief, capital adequacy, MDB reform, and climate finance. The initiative will be coordinated by ACET and FDL, while crowding in African and global experts, as well as African institutions and the TLP. Ideally, the partnership among African policy institutes on the topic of global financial architecture will evolve into a long-term collaboration to collectively address key issues related to global and continent-wide issues that might otherwise not be an area of focus for African policy institutes. Partners will include African economic policy institutes.

Initial partners include:

Regional or pan-African institutionsNational institutions
African Center for Economic TransformationECES (Egypt)
African Economic Research ConsortiumBIDPA (Botswana)
Centre for the Study of the Economies of AfricaIPAR (Rwanda)
Policy Center for the New SouthKIPPRA (Kenya)
South African Institute for International Affairs
Institute for Strategic Studies
AUDA-NEPAD Policy Bridge Tank
Laboratoire de Finances pour le Développement (LAFIDEV)

Representatives from ten economic policy institutes participated in the event:

  • African Center for Economic Transformation – Rob Floyd
  • African Economic Research Consortium – Dianah Ngui Muchai
  • AUDA-NEPAD Policy Bridge Tank – Pamla Gopaul
  • Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa – Mma Amara Ekeruche
  • Finance for Development Labs – Ishac Diwan
  • Institute for Strategic Studies – Mustapha Jobarteh
  • Policy Center for the New South – Hafez Ghanem and Badr Mandri
  • South African Institute for International Affairs – Neuma Grobbelaar
  • Laboratoire de Finances pour le Développement (LAFIDEV) – Babacar Sene
  • KIPPRA (Kenya) – Moses Njenga

Outcomes from the event

There was general validation that greater collaboration among African policy institutes on the global financial architecture agenda is needed and welcomed. Participating think tanks confirmed their interest in partnering on knowledge sharing, analysis and advocacy. Current efforts such as the G20 commissioned Capital Adequacy Framework (CAF), the Bridgetown Agenda and the MDB Reforms were highlighted by ACET. FDL provided a framing for the initiative around the need for new growth paths, finance in the short and longer term, debt, MDB reforms and new funds and institutions.

Partner organizations highlighted past, ongoing, and planned work on global financial architecture issues. For example, ISS gave a brief on the African Futures forecasting model for external financial flows and the Africa Tomorrow blog platform that addresses many of these themes. SAIIA emphasized their work on the Africa-China relationship, opportunities to influence policymakers on these topics via the T20 and the importance of NDB reform as part of the dialogue. CSEA provided a brief on their reports on debt management and how to operationalize the Common Framework, as well as the CoMPRA program which looks at government policy responses prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic, including those related to finance and debt. The PCNS is doing work around climate adaptation and green tech, but is also exploring why global financial structures are not working and where Africa fits in a quickly evolving world where globalization is often not functioning well.

In Kenya, KIPPRA is finalizing work on public debt trends, and also has programs on green economy, climate finance flows, climate smart agriculture and renewables. As well, KIPPRA is assessing climate smart investment opportunities across a range of sectors. AERC is focusing on issues such as financial inclusion in EAC, opportunities and challenges for green tech, and has started work on SDR financing. ACET convenes the Transformation Leadership Panel to advocate on issues such as climate finance, is preparing to undertake a perceptions analysis of African leaders on the global financial architecture and is undertaking research in areas such as absorptive capacity for increased financial flows. FDL has established a network of Chinese researchers on the finance agenda, is completing a study on debt and growth in North Africa and has ongoing work related to the emerging debt crisis.

There was general agreement that topics for the next few meetings should focus on:

  • Green finance given COP27 (December 2022),
  • MDB reform given the deadline for a World Bank reform roadmap (January 2022)
  • Growth strategies in a new global setting (February 2022)
  • Improving access to capital markets (credit rating agencies, enhancements) (March 2022)

Other topics of particular interest include:

  • Debt workouts and instruments (April 2022)
  • Non-traditional donors/investors – China and others (May 2022)

Are current climate initiatives unfair to developing nations?

World leaders are gathered in Egypt for COP27, a global summit to share ideas about mitigating the climate crisis. The planet faces irreversible tipping points if the temperature warms by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

To stave off the worst effects, global greenhouse gas emissions must drop by 45% by 2030. However, the climate initiatives currently in place will cut emissions only 5% to 10% by that date. 

Rahul Tongia, a senior fellow with the Centre for Social and Economic Progress in New Delhi and a nonresident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution, argues that the path to reducing the production of heat-trapping gases is through “practical and equitable emissions trajectories.” 

Tongia believes that developed nations must aggressively cut their emissions instead of asking developing nations to “leapfrog” fossil fuels to renewable energy. “Poorer countries already face the brunt of climate change, but they want to do their fair share of mitigation,” he wrote in a piece published by Brookings. “They may even do some amount of unfair share. But this cannot mean climate absolutism.” 

“Marketplace” host Kai Ryssdal spoke to Tongia about the relationship between energy technology and economic growth and how current climate initiatives are unfair toward developing nations.

Confronting the climate emergency with climate, trade and development policy in sync

One of the defining features of climate negotiations is the emphasis on aligning climate and development goals. The three long-term goals of the Paris Agreement – mitigation of warming, adaptation to impacts and climate-consistent finance – are all pledged “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty”.

If we fail on climate, we will fail on development. But if we fail on development, we will also fail on climate because people and countries will – rightly – continue striving to improve their quality of life through any means necessary, including fossil fuel consumption, land use conversion and other polluting activities.

Yet it is beyond the scope of the UN climate convention to deliver on development. The international trade regime is a proven instrument to boost living standards, given international trades potential to create jobs and provide affordable goods and services. But it is not within the scope of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to deliver on climate.

At COP27, all participants must reflect on how the international agendas for climate, trade and development policy must now be in sync.

How is the trade community responding to climate change?

As the newly released World Trade Report 2022 emphasises, the WTO is ready to assist with roadmaps and a menu of policy choices to support the implementation of climate goals. Recent successes at the WTO on trade and the environment, for example on addressing harmful fishing subsidies (albeit after more than 20 years of negotiations), justify some optimism regarding the potential of new trade rules to support climate goals, such as tackling fossil fuel subsidies.

But when it comes to climate and trade policy at the multilateral level, we are still talking about potential, not actual policy.

The vacuum is increasingly becoming occupied by big unilateral moves, some of which could be contrary to WTO principles unless carefully constructed. The most visible current example is the US Inflation Reduction Act which is intended to drive 2030 economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions to 40% below 2005 levels. This is seriously ambitious climate policy, and much-needed given the outsized role of the US in historical and current emissions.

However, the Inflation Reduction Act has been criticised for providing huge subsidies and violating the WTO principle of non-discrimination. (An EU-US taskforce has been launched in response.) While there may be grounds for this critique, it is striking that the extensive public support provided to the fossil fuel industry in the US – to the tune of $7.6 billion a year before the pandemic – has received little attention by the trade community. Climate action is challenged; climate inaction must be too.

Progress on plurilateral climate change related discussions and climate clubs at the WTO needs to move faster. In many countries, the financial sector now requires climate-related risk disclosures, which has led to a focus on supply chains. But accounting for traded emissions across supply chains remains challenging. WTO members are still yet to even consider agreement on a common carbon accounting method.

Aligning climate, trade and development policy across Africa

In Africa, the challenges and opportunities are being confronted through the African Union’s Green Recovery Action Plan (GRAP) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The GRAP was launched in 2021 and will run until 2027. Its ambition is to tackle the combined challenges of the COVID-19 recovery and climate change by focusing on critical areas of joint priority: renewable energy; nature-based solutions and biodiversity; resilient agriculture; green and resilient cities; and climate finance. Meanwhile, the AfCFTA aims to transform Africa’s production landscape through facilitating intra-regional trade.

The GRAP and AfCFTA will need greater alignment and ambition from African governments to pursue low-carbon development. For instance, linking the GRAP and the AfCFTA could:

  • Offer a pan-African vision and platform for accessing climate finance;
  • Support a carbon trading mechanism through the investment protocol;
  • Promote green technologies through the digital trade protocol.

About 44 out of the 55 countries on the continent have submitted updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs) with ambitious climate targets and economic development at their heart. However, trade and investment policies are also integral to securing climate-smart development across the continent and the AfCFTA offers a rare opportunity to update these as well.

There is strong commitment from African countries to respond to climate change effectively. But although the GRAP in particular signals their national and regional ambition, the Africa Group of Negotiators at COP27 continue to highlight that their members will need long-promised climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building to do so. For the period 2020-2030, the average annual climate funding needs for Africa are estimated at about $142 billion. However, annual climate flows to Africa currently stand at only $30 billion. This deficit must be plugged.

Moreover, given that climate finance and development finance are often focused on similar sectors like infrastructure and social protection, donors need to ensure that all aid is climate-compatible and all climate finance enhances prosperity. Climate-proofing Aid for Trade will be especially important, so that Africa can expand its productive capacity without creating new physical or transition risks.

African countries are making bold moves to align climate and trade policy, with the potential to move faster than multilateral forums like the WTO. International support for their efforts must be continued and scaled to secure prosperity across the continent in a climate-changed world. All eyes are on COP27 to see if it delivers.