Author: Rakan Aboneaaj
IMF-World Bank meetings are the last stop before a coming economic storm
Lawrence H. Summers, a Post Opinions contributing columnist, is a professor at and past president of Harvard University. He was treasury secretary from 1999 to 2001 and an economic adviser to President Barack Obama from 2009 through 2010. Masood Ahmed is president of the Center for Global Development; he has previously served as a senior official at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
When they gather in Washington next week for the International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group annual meetings, the world’s finance ministers face what has been labeled a polycrisis: Challenges ranging from increased interest rates, climate change and an epically strong dollar, to food-supply shortages, high inflation and a still-prevalent pandemic all combine to threaten not just the global economy but also the livelihoods of hundreds of millions.
It is likely that in the next year the United States will go into recession, Europe will be battered by high energy costs and China will suffer its lowest growth in decades. A major slowdown in the global economy is almost inevitable.
What is at stake — what will greatly depend on decisions that finance ministers make next week — is whether developing countries suffer a lost decade of economic opportunity, as happened to many countries in the 1980s, or whether they are enabled to maintain momentum, as occurred after the 2009 financial crisis.
While much will depend on national policy choices, the external environment will be enormously important for most countries. Global cooperation through the IMF and the World Bank matters a great deal. The challenge for these institutions will be not to just discuss new funds and funding mechanisms but to actually deliver the greatly increased support the moment demands.
Action in three areas is essential:
Ease immediate financing pressures: Beyond Ukraine’s need for sustained support, the war has led to higher food, energy and fertilizer prices, all of which are straining the budgets of the most vulnerable low- and middle-income economies. There will be further challenges as interest rates rise, exports to the industrial world fall and diminishing global liquidity makes it harder to attract capital. To avoid cascading downturns, rapid and substantial new finance will be required.
The IMF has provided some financing. As its covid response demonstrated, however, it can do much more — if the fund’s major shareholders provide clear and united direction. Appropriately, the IMF has temporarily raised by 50 percent the ceiling on the financing it provides to countries through its emergency window; it now needs to show similar initiative for its regular programs. Many countries that need IMF financing do not seek it because of the stigma involved. This problem can be addressed by developing a new contingent financing facility that provides funding to countries hurt by external developments without insisting on traditional IMF conditionality.
The World Bank announced that it will scale up new funding commitments to $170 billion through June 2023 to help borrowing countries address these shocks. However, as the bank’s response to the pandemic demonstrated, commitments are not the same as money received: Between 2019 and 2022, the bank increased commitments by over $36 billion but disbursement grew half as quickly. At next week’s meetings, shareholders should extract a pledge that these new commitments will be disbursed quickly.
Deal with unsustainable debt: The issue of debt needs to be tackled, too. Sixty percent of low-income countries and one-third of emerging markets are already at high risk of debt distress. To start, the large creditor countries of the Group of 20 should suspend debt service for the neediest countries, which would provide about $15 billion of cash-flow relief next year.
Even so, many countries will still need to restructure their debt. Unfortunately, the machinery for resolving sovereign debt problems is dysfunctional and unlikely to be rethought anytime soon. But the IMF could help fill the gap by playing a more active role in sovereign debt resolution, working with major creditors to make the process more predictable and productive.
To be sure, there are serious problems of coordination among official as well as between public and private creditors. China’s reluctance to engage in coordinated debt relief and restructurings has been a particular problem given the scale of Chinese holdings. But that is not a reason for others to stand back — it is a reason to move faster so as to set an example.
Don’t forget climate change and pandemics: While the meetings will properly focus on the immediate crisis, it would be reckless to ignore longer-term challenges. An important step would be for shareholders to agree that the World Bank should, over time, substantially reorient its focus onto global rather than just national challenges.
Reducing the risk of pandemics, combating climate change and preserving biodiversity will require a new generation of investment that a reinvented World Bank would be uniquely positioned to catalyze. Sustainability must become as central to the bank’s work as reconstruction and development.
An expanded role for the World Bank would also mean far more lending and advising. The fastest way to get this started would be to implement the recommendations of a recent independent expert group convened by the G-20, which found that the World Bank and other development banks could use existing capital more efficiently while preserving their core financial strength. In parallel, shareholders should start discussions around a “green capital” increase to support an expanded focus on global public goods, and also to drive the bank’s renewal as a partner with the private sector on sustainable investment. Taken together, these changes could drive more than a trillion dollars in new public investment over the next decade and encourage even larger increases in private investment.
Trust in international cooperation has been severely damaged, first by real and perceived shortcomings in the help given to developing countries during the pandemic and now by sky-high food and energy prices and the threat of recession spreading out from the industrial world. The global economy is in dire need of repair. Next week is the time to start.
Multilateral Development Banks’ Capital Adequacy Frameworks: Options for Reform?
This event is co-hosted with ODI.
In 2021, G20 members created an independent panel to evaluate whether multilateral development bank (MDB) shareholder capital is being used efficiently and to understand whether MDBs can lend more without threatening their long-term financial integrity. This was in response to a growing sense among policymakers that MDBs need reforming if they are to play a more meaningful role in addressing the global crises of today and tomorrow.
The panel’s Independent Review of MDBs’ Capital Adequacy Frameworks report was subsequently published in July. It centred on five recommended reforms: re-evaluating MDB risk limits, recognising the benefits of callable capital, expanding the use of financial innovations, enhancing dialogue with credit rating agencies, and promoting greater transparency regarding MDB credit performance.
As well as discussing the recommendations of the report and framing the emerging issues and priorities, this webinar will explore the following questions:
- Are MDB capital adequacy policies fit for purpose to face current global challenges?
- Can MDBs safely lend more without threatening their bond ratings?
SPEAKERS
Chair
Sara Pantuliano
Chief Executive, ODI (Chair)
Masood Ahmed
President, Center for Global Development (Moderator)
Introductory remarks
Francesca Utili, Director of International Financial Relations, Italian Department of the Treasury
Presenters
Frannie Leautier, CEO SouthBridge Group and ODI Trustee – Expert Chair of the Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks’ Capital Adequacy Frameworks
Chris Humphrey, Senior Research Associate, ODI – Member of the expert group
Hans Peter Lankes, Visiting Professor in Practice, London School of Economics – Member of the expert group
Nancy Lee, Senior Policy Fellow, Center for Global Development – Member of the expert group
Discussants
Afsaneh Beschloss, CEO, RockCreek
María del Carmen Bonilla Rodríguez, Deputy Undersecretary for Public Credit, Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
Wempi Saputra, Assistant Minister of Finance for Macroeconomy and International Finance, Government of Indonesia
Rajiv Shah, President, Rockefeller Foundation
MDB Policy-Based Guarantees: Has Their Time Come?
Multilateral development bank policy-based guarantees (PBGs) have long been an instrument in search of demand. First introduced in 1999 at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to help governments access market borrowing at attractive rates, their track-record has been uneven, and their uptake limited. The multilateral development bank (MDB) business model tends to favor direct lending over non-lending products. And MDBs have experienced high-profile bumpy patches with PBGs—including a 2015 PBG for Ghana which sparked significant controversy around whether it generated an actual financial benefit for the country – that may have deterred countries from using the instrument. Moreover, the benign global interest rate environment that has prevailed since the Global Financial Crisis has generally helped governments access external commercial financing at historically low rates, making PBGs less directly relevant.
But PBGs have also had their successes, especially during times of stressed market conditions. PBGs have proven useful in insulating issuers from external market turmoil and helped governments secure better terms – reducing funding costs by an average of 330 basis points compared to what governments would have achieved had they pursued unenhanced issuances. They have helped new issuers establish market access and grow their investor base. They have helped countries reprofile expensive commercial debt on more favorable terms. They have helped governments secure private sector participation in restructuring exercises. And some governments are starting to use PBGs to raise funds for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) programs and projects, raising the possibility of a new generation of ESG PBGs.
PBGs have also proven more catalytic than direct lending, with $1 PBG mobilizing on average $1.8 in commercial finance.
PBGs could become freshly relevant as the world grapples with multiple crises, increased capital market volatility, heightened risk aversion, and tightening monetary conditions. Indeed, many of their strengths are well-tailored to the challenges governments in emerging and frontier markets will increasingly face in the coming years. Going forward, PBGs could be particularly useful debt management tools to help governments maintain market access on more favorable terms and reprofile or restructure debt while mobilizing more private finance for ESG programs.
Read the full note here.
A Dive into MDB Policy-Based Guarantees: Relevant but in Need of Reform?
Policy-based guarantees (PBGs) have long been a multilateral development bank (MDB) instrument in search of a purpose. PBGs—a credit enhancement for sovereign market borrowing—have been around for decades but their uptake has been limited. In most instances, they have proven remarkably effective in helping to reduce governments’ external financing costs and mobilize large volumes of private capital. As we enter a period of heightened global economic volatility, PBGs could become a particularly useful instrument for emerging and frontier markets seeking to maintain access at affordable rates. They could also be a useful tool for countries seeking to reprofile external debt or restructure their commercial debt.
In a new note, we review 13 PBGs issued by MDB over the past 10 years and find that they helped lower countries’ cost of funding by 330 basis points (bps) on average. We also find that PBGs are distinctly catalytic—the $4 billion in guarantees included in our sample have crowded in $7.2 billion worth of total commercial financing, or 78 percent more than would have been possible using traditional MDB loans.
Several factors can influence the success of a PBG operation, many of which depend on the MDBs’ own internal financial policies. Chief among these is the way in which MDBs count guarantees against country lending limits. While all MDBs book guarantees like loans on their balance sheets, some MDBs have set-aside windows that allow them to only count PBGs on a 1:4 basis against a country’s lending limit. This reduces the opportunity cost for a country pursuing a PBG instead of a loan, thereby increasing the financial appeal of a PBG.
Going forward, we see a greater rationale for PBGs for countries borrowing from the concessional windows and smaller economies. In the current economic context, they could be particularly useful for countries with sound macroeconomic fundamentals facing unfavorable external financing conditions. PBGs could also be useful instruments in the context of sovereign debt negotiations to entice private sector participation. Finally, a major untapped PBG angle is to bring together countries’ interests in advancing their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policy objectives with private investor interest in boosting the ESG share of their portfolios. To date, much of the MDBs’ PBG policy agenda has focused on macroeconomic reforms, but PBGs could be used to support ESG policies and programs.
For more, read our new note here.